The UAE and Bahrain’s deals with Israel are huge blunders
This past month has seen a great deal of normalization between the Arab Gulf States and Israel. In an event that would have been inconcievable in previous years, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain have established full diplomatic ties with Israel. There is a general consensus that more nations will follow them; Bahraini policy is seen as an extension of Saudi Arabia’s, and Omani officials have been hinting at increasing ties with Israel. Sudan’s new military leadership also has strong ties to the aforementioned Arab nations, and may need to normalize for America to rid Sudan of sanctions that have been strangling its economy. Regardless of whether you think this is a blessing for the cause of Middle Eastern Peace or a betrayal of the Palestinians, this is clealry a tactical failure on behalf of the Arab Gulf.
Before delving into the reasons for this deal being a diplomatic debacle, it first must be established that these deals do not benefit Palestine or the Palestinians at all. In the full text of the UAE-Israel deal, the word “Palestinian” is only mentioned once; the text mainly detailing cooperation between the two countries in the forms of security, technology, tourism and trade. Israel’s “concession” was that they woud suspend their illegal annexation of parts of the West Bank, but this just means they would put this plan on hold, not stop it. Therefore, the Palestinians did not gain anything from such a deal. It is clear that this normalization did not happen for the sake of peace, but rather for the mutual gain of the two nations. Many people in the Middle East see this as absolute treason, which leads us to why this is such a disaster for the Arab Gulf’s standing in the regional arena.
When speaking of geopolitical strength, a distinction is made between “hard” and “soft” power. Hard power is the physcial strength of a country; its resources, military, size, economy etc. The Arab States and Israel gain quite a bit of that with normalization. For example, due to this new agreement, Israel approved American sales of F-35 fighter jets to the United Arab Emirates, which would increase the Emirate’s defense capabilities. The motivating factor here is the “Middle Eastern Cold War”, where Saudi Arabia and its allies are pit against Iran and their allies in a fight for dominance of the region. To win a Cold War, you also need soft power, which consists of winning hearts and minds. By increasing the “public appeal” of a country, they’re more likely to gain popular approval in other countries, a key to good diplomatic relations and garnering support. By opening relatons with Israel on every front, the U.A.E., Bahrain and the potentially the rest of the GCC states significantly reduce their soft power, since Israel is still seen as an enemy by the vast majority of Arabs.
In the following survey from 2018, it was found that the overwhelming majority in most Arab countries did not want relations with Israel, with an Arab average of 87% and the figure reaching as high as 97% in Lebanon. Thus, it is almost certain that the average Arab person will be at the very least upset over the two recent agreements. Now, people are less likely to symapthize with the Gulf states, and the soft power dramatically decreases. Even in the deal-making countries themselves, there can be opposition. For instance, Bahrain was not included in the poll, but Kuwait, the most demographically, culturally and politically similar nation to Bahrain on the list almost unanimously rejected normalization, so the people of Bahrain are likely to feel the same. This is dangerous for the regime in Bahrain, as there is a lot of history of oppostion to the monarchy there, and such a move may be the fuel to the fire. It is countries like Bahrain where there are both pro-Saudi and pro-Iranian groups of people that are important to win over in such a Cold War. If the regime there falls, it may very well flip to the other side, which brings us to the next set of survey results.
Hezbollah, a large Lebanese political party and militia, is a close ally of Iran that basically emulates its foreign policy. In 2006, they fought a brief war with Israel and won. This clearly gave them a boost in their popularity, as there were mainly positive opinions of them in four of the five Arab countries surveyed in the year after the war. However, seven years later, opinions became largely negative. What this proves is that the fortitude of the Arab hate for Israel is so strong that even if a faction or nation that they regularly disapprove of fights Israel, they will gain the support and respect of the Arab public. Thus, with Iran’s adamant rejection of Israel and most of the GCC doing the opposite, it is clear which side the people of the region are most likely to take. The Sunnis of the region are going to look to Turkey and Qatar as backers rather than the Saudi camp, and with the former group coordinating with Iran more and more frequently, it seems obvious as to which side is winning hearts and minds.
The GCC states can not play the role of the leader of the Arabs and Sunni Muslims if they ally with a state that has been an enemy of these two peoples for decades. Despite what certain Arab regimes do or say, the people who they govern sympathize with the Palestinian cause, and this fact does not seem like it will change. Hard power is temporary; economies dip and rise, technology becomes more advanced and weapons become more deadly over time. On the other hand, soft power resonates with people for a much longer time, and Palestine lives in the hearts of Arabs from Morocco to Iraq. The recent deals lack foresight and tact, and may help switch the balance of the current regional conflict.
